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A ‘GOOD FAITH’ INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO MANIFEST 
RELIGION? THE DIVERGING APPROACHES OF THE EUROPEAN 





The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and UN Human Rights Committee 
have reached contradictory decisions in cases concerning the right to manifest religion. 
This discrepancy calls into question the universality of the right and is problematic 
from the perspective of legal certainty. Consequently, this article explores the extent 
to which the diverging decisions of these two bodies are compatible with a good faith 
interpretation of the right to manifest religion. A good faith interpretation of the right 
is identified by utilising the travaux préparatoires and subsequent interpretations. It is 
argued that by failing to scrutinise the necessity of restrictions and the role of 
secularism, the ECtHR has undermined this good faith interpretation and, in so doing, 
is not fulfilling its role as ‘the conscience of Europe’.  
 
 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The right to freedom of religion or belief, as contained in the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR)1 and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
																																								 																				
1  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms CETS No 005, 
entered into force 3 September 1953 (ECHR). 
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(ICCPR),2 has a common origin in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).3 Despite these common origins, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) 4 and UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) 5 have reached contradictory 
decisions in analogous cases concerning the right to manifest religion by wearing 
religious clothing. A small degree of variance must be expected between the 
approaches of the regional ECtHR and the international HRC. However, this should 
not compromise the universality of human rights standards. Consequently, it is 
necessary to consider whether these contradictory interpretations of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief are both compatible with a good faith interpretation of 
the right. 
 The rules of treaty interpretation reveal that human rights standards should be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the intentions of the parties.6 This article 
identifies a good faith interpretation of the right to freedom of religion or belief by 
utilising original research into the travaux préparatoires of the ECHR, ICCPR and 
UDHR. This reveals that the object and purpose of the right to freedom of religion or 
belief is to restrict State interference with matters of conscience, in particular if 
																																								 																				
2  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 
1976 (ICCPR). 
3  Universal Declaration of Human Rights GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948) (UDHR). 
4  Mann Singh v France App no 24479/07 (ECtHR 13 November 2008); Jasvir Singh v France App 
no 25463/08 (ECtHR 30 June 2009); Ranjit Singh v France App no 27561/08 (ECtHR 30 June 
2009). 
5  Bikramjit Singh v France Communication no 1852/2008 (HRC 4 February 2013); Ranjit Singh v 
France Communication no 1876/2009 (2011) 32 BHRC 275; Mann Singh v France 
Communication no 1928/2010 (2013) 36 BHRC 675. 
6  Articles 31-33 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331, entered into force 27 
January 1980 (VCLT). 
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motivated by the preservation of the dominant or State ideology. The right was 
recognised to be of particular importance for religious minorities, given their 
vulnerability to such interference. While the HRC’s interpretation has been consistent 
with these aims, this article takes the view that the ECtHR has directly undermined 
them. By awarding States a wide margin of appreciation, the ECtHR has allowed 
States to interfere with the right to manifest religion, without evidence of the necessity 
and proportionality of such restrictions. This has led the ECtHR to legitimise a vision 
of State secularism that seeks to eliminate rather than protect religious freedom and 
prioritises secular and Christian beliefs above minority beliefs. Were the ECtHR to 
interpret the right to manifest religion consistently with the good faith interpretation 
identified in this article, its jurisprudence is likely to be consistent with that of the 
HRC.  
Other academic work in this field has focused on the use of the margin of 
appreciation in freedom of religion cases. Lewis, for example, has argued that the 
ECtHR does not adequately consider the necessity of the restriction on the applicants’ 
rights.7 Whereas, Evans has criticised the ECtHR for unquestioningly accepting ‘the 
elevated position of secularism’.8 In contrast, this article considers the broader picture 
																																								 																				
7  T Lewis ‘What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court and the Margin of Appreciation’ 
(2007) 56 ICLQ 395 at pp 408-411. See, further, MD Evans ‘Freedom of Religion and the 
European Convention on Human Rights: Approaches, Trends and Tensions’ in P Cane, C Evans 
and Z Robinson (eds) Law and Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context (Cambridge: CUP, 
2008) p 307; M Borovali ‘Islamic Headscarves and Slippery Slopes’ (2009) 30 Cardozo Law 
Review 2593 at p 2594. 
8  C Evans ‘Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: 
Cracks in the Intellectual Architecture’ (2010-2011) 26 Journal of Law and Religion 331 at p 336. 
See, further, M Evans ‘Human Rights and the Freedom of Religion’ in M Ipgrave (ed) Justice & 
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by analysing the compatibility of the differing interpretations of the ECtHR and HRC 
with a good faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion. Although focused on 
the right to manifest religion, the conclusions drawn in this article have implications 
for the ECtHR’s use of the margin of appreciation in cases concerning other 
Convention rights.  
This article first employs the principles of treaty interpretation, in conjunction 
with the travaux préparatoires and subsequent interpretations, to identify a good faith 
interpretation of the right to manifest religion. Second, the identified good faith 
interpretation is used to analyse the approaches of both the ECtHR and HRC in 
analogous cases concerning the right to manifest religion. The potential implications 
of the ECtHR adhering to a good faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion 
are elaborated. Third, it is argued that by permitting societal consensus to dictate the 
content of the right, the ECtHR has allowed the scope of the right to freedom of 
religion to be narrowed to the extent that it does not achieve its original purpose. 
 
2. IDENTIFYING A ‘GOOD FAITH’ INTERPRETATION OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR 
BELIEF 
 
The ECtHR and HRC have reached contradictory decisions in analogous cases 
concerning the right of Sikhs to manifest their religion by wearing the keski and 
turban.9 The inconsistent interpretation of the right to manifest religion has the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													
Rights – Christian and Muslim Perspectives (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2009) p 115. 
9  Mann Singh v France, above n 4; Jasvir Singh v France, above n 4; Ranjit Singh v France, above 
n 4; Bikramjit Singh v France, above n 5; Ranjit Singh v France, above n 5; Mann Singh v France, 
above n 5. 
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potential to undermine its universal protection and has implications for legal certainty. 
Consequently, it is not possible for both approaches to be ‘correct’. It is, therefore, 
necessary to examine which approach is most consistent with a good faith 
interpretation of the right to manifest religion or belief. In accordance with article 
31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, ‘the general rule’, ‘[a] treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. 
The ECtHR has also established the principle that limitations on Convention rights 
‘cannot justify impairing the very essence of the right’.10 The concept of the ‘essence 
of the right’ has been interpreted to refer to ‘an absolute indispensable core to the 
right which cannot be impaired regardless of the circumstances’11 and, thus, should 
align with the right’s object and purpose.  
Recourse to the travaux préparatoires of human rights instruments facilitates 
the identification of a good faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion by 
revealing the context of the adoption of individual rights and the intention of the 
parties. However, as human rights instruments are ‘living instruments’, the use of the 
travaux préparatoires must be approached with caution,12 as it may result in a static 
																																								 																				
10  Winterwerp v Netherlands (1979-80) 2 EHRR 387 para 60.  
11  L Hoyans ‘What is Balanced on the Scales of Justice? In Search of the Essence of the Right to a 
Fair Trial’ (2014) Criminal Law Review 4 at p 15. 
12  Sir H Waldock ‘Third Report on the Law of Treaties’ [1964] ILC Yearbook vol II, 58 at para 21; 
G Letsas A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 
2007) pp 72-79. 
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and restrictive interpretation of the right.13 Letsas has distinguished between the 
concrete and the abstract intentions of the drafters in this respect: ‘they had a concrete 
idea of what human rights there are but it was their more abstract belief in the moral 
objectivity and universality of these rights that led them to draft the ECHR’.14 The 
concrete intentions of the drafters are reflective of society in the ten drafting States of 
the ECHR in the late 1940s,15 and, thus, do not assist the identification of a good faith 
interpretation of the right to manifest religion.16 In contrast, the abstract intentions of 
the drafters, identified through the travaux préparatoires, reveal the object and 
purpose of human rights instruments.17  
In this section the principles of treaty interpretation are used to establish a 
good faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion. The text of the right to 
manifest religion is considered separately from its context and object and purpose. 
The evidence provided by the travaux préparatoires will be considered alongside the 
subsequent interpretation of the content of the right by the ECtHR and HRC, in order 
to avoid the identification of a static interpretation of freedom of religion.  
 
(a) The Text of the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief 
 
																																								 																				
13  Feldbrugge v The Netherlands (A/99) (1986) 8 EHRR 425 joint dissenting opinion of Judges 
Ryssdal, Bindschedler-Robert, Lagergren, Matscher, Sir Vincent Evans, Bernhardt And Gersing 
para 24.  
14  Letsas, above n 12, p 70. 
15  Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom.  
16  Letsas, above n 12, p 74. 
17  Ibid, p 72. 
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The text of the right to freedom of religion or belief provides a useful starting point 
from which to identify a good faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion. 
Nonetheless, as the adoption of a strict textual approach to treaty interpretation has the 
potential to lead to a narrow understanding of the right, this must be supplemented 
with the consideration of the context and object and purpose. 
 The right to freedom of religion or belief is enshrined in article 9(1) ECHR, 
article 18 ICCPR and article 18 UDHR. Article 9(1) ECHR establishes that:  
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, 
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance.  
 
The text of article 9 ECHR and article 18 ICCPR are virtually identical, having both 
been based on article 18 UDHR. The emphasis on ‘freedom’ indicates that the right is 
‘primarily of a defensive nature’.18 Consequently, its central component is protection 
from external interference in matters of conscience including State interference. By 
providing ‘the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’, the text of these 
rights indicates that all forms of belief, religious or otherwise, find protection. 
Although the travaux préparatoires to the ICCPR indicate that the drafters did not 
																																								 																				
18  M Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl: NP Engel, 2nd 
edn, 2005) p 411. 
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agree as to whether ‘the word “belief” covered also secular belief’,19 subsequent 
practice confirms that it does.20  
 The text of article 9 ECHR, article 18 ICCPR and article 18 UDHR also 
reveals that the right to freedom of religion or belief comprises both the right to hold a 
belief and the right to manifest that belief, ‘in public or private’. Although the external 
manifestation of religion may be restricted in accordance with the limitations clauses, 
it remains a fundamental element of the right, as noted by Mr Dehousse of Belgium 
during the drafting of the UDHR: ‘It would be unnecessary to proclaim that freedom 
[of religion] if it were never to be given outward expression; if it were intended, so to 
speak, only for the use of the inner man’.21 Thus, the creation of the right to hold a 
belief was not considered by the drafters of human rights instruments to be sufficient 
to protect religious adherents. The right to manifest religion was deliberately included 
in human rights instruments in order to guard against unwarranted interference with 
the expression of that belief.  
 Four forms of manifestation expressly find protection under the right to 
freedom of religion, namely, worship, observance, teaching and practice. 
Krishnaswami, in his 1960 report, explained that this was intended to encompass all 
																																								 																				
19  Third Committee 15th Session (1960) UN doc A/4625 para 51 in MJ Bossuyt Guide to the 
“Travaux Préparatoires” of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). 
20  Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397 para 31. See also, HRC, ‘General Comment No 22’ on 
‘The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion (Art. 18)’ UN doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 para 2; A Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the Matter of 
Religious Rights and Practices, UN doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1, p 1.  
21  UNGA Third Committee of the General Assembly, Record of 127th Meeting, held on 9 November 
1948 UN doc A/C.3/SR.127, p 395. 
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conceivable manifestations of religion.22 This has subsequently been interpreted 
expansively by the HRC in General Comment 22,23 and, notably, both the ECtHR and 
HRC have recognised that headcoverings constitute a protected manifestation of 
religion.24  
 The manifestation of religion is, nonetheless, subject to limitation in 
accordance with article 9(2) ECHR and article 18(3) ICCPR. These were based on the 
generic limitation clause contained in article 29(2) UDHR. The text of article 9(2) 
ECHR and article 18(3) ICCPR permits limitations to the right to manifest religion ‘in 
the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. These limitations were 
initially envisaged to be extremely narrow, with delegates at the drafting of the 
UDHR referring to human sacrifice, flagellation, savage mortification and death ritual 
as examples of when the manifestation of religion could be legitimately restricted.25 
This approach was subsequently reaffirmed by the Krishnaswami report which 
suggested a more expansive list of justifiable limitations: ‘[i]nto this category fall 
such practices as the sacrifice of human beings, self-immolation, mutilation of the self 
or others, and reduction into slavery or prostitution, if carried out in the service of, or 
under the pretext of promoting, a religion or belief’,26 polygamy,27 ‘rebellion or 
																																								 																				
22  Krishnaswami, above n 20, p 17; PM Taylor Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human 
Rights Law and Practice (Cambridge: CUP, 2005) p 221. 
23  HRC, above n 20, para 4. 
24   Dahlab v Switzerland (15 February 2001), App no 42393/98 ECHR 2001-V; Şahın v Turkey 
(2007) 44 EHRR 5 para 78. HRC, above n 20, para 4. 
25  GA, above n 21, pp 390-391.  
26  Krishnaswami, above n 20, p 29. 
27  Ibid, p 30. 
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subversion’28 and acts contrary to peace and security.29 The ground of ‘the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others’ was, accordingly, intended to prevent religious 
manifestation from infringing the concrete rights of individuals, elaborated in human 
rights instruments.  
 The ECtHR has subsequently accepted that ‘it may be necessary to place 
restrictions on this freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups 
and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected’.30 Consequently, in the event of an 
irreconcilable clash between the rights of different groups, it may be justifiable to 
restrict individual religious freedom in order to protect ‘the rights and freedoms of 
others’. However, by accepting that secularism, 31  understood as the separation 
between Church and State, and ‘living together’32 justify the restriction of the right to 
manifest religion, the ECtHR has allowed the ground of ‘the rights and freedoms of 
others’ to be expanded beyond the original intentions of the drafters.  
  The evolution of the limitations clause and the ground of ‘the rights and 
freedoms of others’ is not problematic, provided that restrictions are compatible with 
the purpose ‘for which they have been prescribed’.33 The list of justifiable restrictions 
foreseen by the drafters of the UDHR is not an exhaustive list and represents a 
concrete rather than abstract understanding of the provision.34 As suggested by Letsas, 
																																								 																				
28  Ibid, p 29. 
29  Ibid, p 30. 
30  Kokkinakis v Greece, above n 20, para 33.  
31  Dahlab v Switzerland, above n 24; Şahın v Turkey, above n 24, paras 109-110, 114; Dogru v 
France (2009) 49 EHRR 8, para 72; Aktas v France App no 43563/08 (ECtHR 30 June 2009). 
32  SAS v France (2015) 60 EHRR 11, para 153. 
33  Article 18 ECHR.  
34  Letsas, above n 12, p 74. 
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the evolution of this clause is permissible, provided that it does not impair the 
abstract intentions of the drafters.35 The travaux préparatoires do, however, clearly 
reveal the abstract intention that the limitations clause be construed narrowly.  
  Furthermore, the text of article 9(2) ECHR and article 18(3) ICCPR indicates 
that once an interference with the right to manifest religion has been established, any 
restriction must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. The State bears the burden of 
proof and must, therefore, demonstrate that the interference was justifiable and 
proportionate. The former UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief has 
submitted:  
 
[T]he burden of justifying a limitation upon the freedom to manifest one’s 
religion or belief lies with the State. Consequently, a prohibition of 
wearing religious symbols which is based on mere speculation or 
presumption rather than on demonstrable facts is regarded as a violation 
of the individual’s religious freedom.36 
 
The ECtHR has accordingly established the principle of priority to rights37 and, 
recognised that limitations on Convention rights ‘cannot justify impairing the very 
essence of the right’.38 Similarly, the HRC has stressed that ‘[l]imitations imposed 
must be established by law and must not be applied in a manner that would vitiate the 
																																								 																				
35  Ibid, p 72.  
36  UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Civil and Political Rights, including the Question of 
Religious Intolerance – Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma 
Jahangir’ (9 January 2006) UN doc E/CN.4/2006/5 para 53. 
37  Belgian Linguistics Case (A/6) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 252, pp 280-81.  
38  Winterwerp v Netherlands, above n 10, para 60.  
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rights guaranteed in article 18’.39 By requiring that the State provide evidence of the 
necessity of the interference, the text of the limitations clause reveals that priority 
should be afforded to the right to manifest religion.  
 
(b) The Context and Object and Purpose of the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief 
 
Crawford has opined that ‘the language of treaties … will be read so as to give effect 
to the object and purpose of the treaty in its context’.40 The context of the adoption of 
human rights instruments following World War II only requires brief introduction and 
is connected to their object and purpose. The Preambles to the UDHR and ECHR 
reveal that the atrocities committed during World War II motivated the adoption of 
universal human rights standards. Notably, the Preamble to the ECHR reaffirms that 
human rights ‘are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy 
and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the Human Rights 
upon which they depend’. Representatives at the drafting of the ECHR specifically 
recognised that democratic States were not immune from committing human rights 
abuses:  
 
Monstesquieu said: “Whoever has power, is tempted to abuse it.” Even 
parliamentary majorities are in fact sometimes tempted to abuse their 
																																								 																				
39  HRC, above n 20, para 8.  
40  J Crawford ‘Sovereignty as a Legal Value’ in J Crawford and M Koskenniemi, The Cambridge 
Companion to International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2012) p 123. 
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power. Even in our democratic countries we must be on guard against this 
temptation of succumbing to reasons of State.41  
 
The UDHR, ECHR and ICCPR were adopted to prevent a repeat of the atrocities 
committed during World War II and, ergo, to protect the individual from unwarranted 
State interference with the exercise of fundamental freedoms.  
 Human rights bodies have subsequently accepted the necessity of restrictions 
placed on political ideologies that are prima facie incompatible with this aim. Thus, 
although the European Commission on Human Rights has indicated that fascism, 
communism and neo-Nazi principles may fall within ‘belief’ for the purposes of 
article 9 ECHR,42 human rights bodies have consistently accepted that the restriction 
of the manifestation of these beliefs is necessary in a democratic society43 and, in the 
case of political parties motivated by these ideologies, have held complaints to be an 
abuse of rights under article 17 ECHR.44 
The atrocities committed during World War II also informed the adoption of 
the right to freedom of religion or belief. The right had been enshrined in the national 
																																								 																				
41  Statement of M Teitgen (France) at Consultative Assembly 1st Session in Council of Europe 
Collected Edition of the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the European Convention on Human Rights 
Volume I: Preparatory Commission of the Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers Consultative 
Assembly 11 May-8 September 1949 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) p 40.  
42   D Harris, M O'Boyle, E Bates & C Buckley Harris, O'Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2nd edn, 2009) p 426. 
43  X v Italy (1976) 5 DR 83; Hazar and Açik v Turkey (1991) 72 DR 200; X v Austria (1963) 13 CD 
42. 
44  Communist Party of Germany v the Federal Republic of Germany App no 250/57 (ECommHR 20 
July 1957); B.H., M.W., H.P. and G.K. v Austria (1989) 62 DR 216. See also, MA v Italy 
Communication 117/1981 (HRC 10 April 1984) para 13.3.  
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constitutions of many UN Member States prior to the adoption of international human 
rights instruments.45 Furthermore, the potential for the denial of freedom of religion to 
lead to international tensions had been recognised on an international stage and the 
rights of religious minorities had previously been included in peace treaties and the 
League of Nations minority protection regime.46 This history of protecting religious 
freedom was influential during the drafting of the ECHR. The Italian representative, 
Mr. Cingolani, described freedom of religion as ‘the most sacred right of all’.47 
Whereas, the Irish representative, Mr Everett, stressed that ‘[c]ivil and religious 
freedom are but two of the fundamental rights of man … If the Council of Europe 
achieved no other end than the guarantee of those two rights, it will have justified its 
existence’.48 Given the context of the adoption of human rights instruments and the 
prevalence of the right in national constitutions, the inclusion of the right to freedom 
of religion or belief in international human rights instruments was uncontroversial.  
During the drafting of the UDHR and ECHR, representatives expressed 
particular concern about interference with the freedom of religion or belief of those 
who do not subscribe to the dominant religious or political ideology. The Dutch 
representative at the drafting of the UDHR noted that ‘in the seventeen and eighteenth 
centuries … those who practised a religion other than that of the head of the State had 
																																								 																				
45  ECOSOC ‘Commission on Human Rights Drafting Committee International Bill of Rights’ 11 
June 1947 UN doc E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1, pp 101-116. 
46  MD Evans Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 1997) pp 55-57.  
47  Statement of Mr. Cingolani (Italy) at Consultative Assembly 1st Session in Council of Europe, 
above n 41, p 62 
48  Statement of Mr. Everett (Ireland) at Consultative Assembly 1st Session in Council of Europe, 
above n 41, pp 102-104. 
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been persecuted in many countries’.49 More contemporaneously, State representatives 
were concerned about State interference with freedom of religion or belief, motivated 
not only ‘Hitlerism’ and Fascism50 but also the Communist East.51 In the context of 
Eastern Europe, Mr Norton, the Irish representative to the Consultative Assembly of 
the ECHR, warned of ‘a new type of “Statism”’ and in particular that:  
 
An effort is being made there to put out the light of the Church – not only 
of one church but of almost all churches. There, an effort is being made to 
say to men and women that they shall worship in the way prescribed by 
the State, and not in the way dictated by their own consciences.52  
 
Thus, the drafting of the right to freedom of religion or belief reveals the intention to 
protect the religious from interference by the State and, notably, from restrictions or 
interpretations of religion informed by the prevalent religious or political ideology.  
																																								 																				
49  Statement of Mr Van der Mandele (The Netherlands) at ECOSOC, Record of 215th Meeting held 
on 25 August 1958 UN doc E/SR.215, p 644.  
50  Statement of Mr Wilson (United Kingdom) at ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights Drafting 
Committee Second Session 21st Meeting, held on 4 May 1948 UN doc E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.21 p 7; 
UNGA, 145th Plenary Meeting 27 September 1948, p 189; Teitgen, above n 41, p 40; Statement of 
M. Kraft (Denmark) at Consultative Assembly 1st Session in Council of Europe, , above n 41, p 66; 
Statement of Mr Foster (United Kingdom) at Consultative Assembly 1st Session in Council of 
Europe, above n 41, p 96.  
51  Statement of Mr Norton (Ireland) at Consultative Assembly 1st Session in Council of Europe, 
above n 41, pp 128-130. 
52  Ibid. 
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 The right to freedom of religion or belief has not been interpreted to prohibit 
State religions or ideologies.53 However, those who do not subscribe to these beliefs 
must not be disadvantaged in the exercise of this right. This view has been stressed by 
the HRC, in General Comment No 22: 
 
If a set of beliefs is treated as official ideology in constitutions, statutes, 
proclamations of ruling parties, etc., or in actual practice, this shall not 
result in any impairment of the freedoms under article 18 or any other 
rights recognized under the Covenant nor in any discrimination against 
persons who do not accept the official ideology or who oppose it.54  
 
Similarly, the ECtHR has repeatedly stressed ‘the State’s role as the neutral and 
impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs’,55 in 
particular, in relation to the exercise of its powers.56 Consequently, the existence of a 
State religion or ideology does not justify the unequal treatment of those who 
subscribe to a different ideology.   
 While the object and purpose of the right to manifest religion is State non-
interference with the religious freedom of all individuals, the drafters of human rights 
instruments in the post-War period recognised that religious minorities were 
																																								 																				
53  HRC, above n 20, para 9. Darby v Sweden (1989) 56-A DR 166 annex to the decision of the Court 
cited in C Evans Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: 
OUP, 2001) p 80. 
54  HRC, above n 20, para 10.  
55  Şahın v Turkey, above n 24, para 107. 
56  Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v Moldova (2002) 35 EHRR 13 para 116; 
Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v Austria (2009) 48 EHRR 17 para 97.  
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particularly vulnerable to such interference. The Chairperson of the drafting 
committee of the UDHR, Eleanor Roosevelt, opined that rather than providing 
targeted minority rights protection, ‘the best solution of the problem of minorities was 
to encourage respect for human rights’.57 The delegation of the United Kingdom 
submitted that ‘the declaration already fully protected the rights of all minorities’, 
pointing, specifically, to the right to freedom of religion as evidence of this.58 The 
drafters of human rights instruments, thus, had the abstract intention that human 
rights standards should protect religious minorities from State interference.  
 The HRC has subsequently reiterated the importance of freedom of religion or 
belief for religious minorities and has ‘view[ed] with concern any tendency to 
discriminate against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that 
they … represent religious minorities that may be the subject of hostility on the part 
of a predominant religious community’.59 Likewise, the ECtHR has emphasised that 
‘[t]he pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won 
over the centuries, depends on it [freedom of religion or belief]’.60 Consequently, the 
specific vulnerability of religious minorities to interference with this right has been 
recognised by both the drafters and monitoring bodies of human rights instruments.  
																																								 																				
57  Statement of Mrs Roosevelt (USA) at UNGA, Third Committee of the General Assembly, Record 
of 161st Meeting, held on 27 November 1948 UN doc A/C.3/SR.161, p 724. See also, Statements 
of Mr Loufti (Egypt). Mrs Mehta (India) and Mr Lebeau (Belgium) at ECOSOC, Commission on 
Human Rights, Third Session, Summary Record of the 73rd Meeting held on 15 June 1948 UN doc 
E/CN.4/SR.73, pp 5-6.  
58  Statement of Mr Davies (United Kingdom) at UNGA, Third Committee of the General Assembly, 
Record of 162nd Meeting, held on 27 November 1948 UN doc A/C.3/SR/162 pp 730-731. 
59  HRC, above n 20, para 2.  
60  Kokkinakis v Greece, above n 20, para 31.  




(c) A Good Faith Interpretation 
 
The text, context and object and purpose reveal that the central component of a good 
faith interpretation of freedom of religion or belief is non-interference with matters of 
conscience. This encompasses a requirement that States refrain from and prevent 
interference with the public and private manifestation of all religions and beliefs, 
without distinction. Furthermore, States must not prioritise a religious or political 
ideology above individual religious freedom, including minority beliefs and 
manifestations. While the right to manifest religion was intended be construed widely, 
its limitation clause was intended to be construed narrowly. This, therefore, suggests 
that State non-interference and the equal treatment of different beliefs should be the 
default position. 
 
3. CONTRADICTORY DECISIONS AND APPLYING A GOOD FAITH INTERPRETATION OF THE 
RIGHT TO MANIFEST BELIEF 
 
While the ECtHR has developed an extensive body of jurisprudence in relation to the 
right to manifest religion by wearing religious clothing, it was not until 2011 that the 
HRC was given the opportunity to engage fully with this issue. Between 2011 and 
2013, the HRC decided the cases of Bikramjit Singh v France, Ranjit Singh v France 
and Mann Singh v France, concerning the right of Sikhs to wear the turban in identity 
documents and the keski to State schools.61 These cases were directly analogous to the 
																																								 																				
61  Bikramjit Singh v France, above n 5; Ranjit Singh v France, above n 5; Mann Singh v France, 
above n 5. 
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cases of Mann Singh v France, Jasvir Singh v France and Ranjit Singh v France that 
had previously been decided by the ECtHR.62 Despite the similar background and 
wording of article 9 ECHR and article 18 ICCPR, the ECtHR and HRC reached 
contradictory decisions in these cases. This section, first, compares the mandates, 
jurisdiction and evolution of the case law of the ECtHR and HRC, in order to 
ascertain the extent to which key differences may explain this divergence. Second, the 
decisions of the ECtHR and HRC in the analogous cases are analysed against the 
identified good faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion.  
 
(a) Comparing the ECtHR and the HRC 
 
The divergence in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and HRC may, in part, be 
explained by evolution of the jurisprudence in this field, as well as their distinct roles 
and mandates. The HRC has not had the opportunity to develop extensive case law in 
relation to freedom of religion generally,63 or the right to manifest religion by wearing 
																																								 																				
62  Mann Singh v France, above n 4; Jasvir Singh v France, above n 4; Ranjit Singh v France, above 
n 4. 
63  The HRC has primarily considered the right to freedom of religion in the context of education, (see 
for example, Hartikainen v Finland Communication no 40/1978 (HRC 9 April 1981); Waldman v 
Canada Communication no 694/1996 (1999) 7 IHRR 368; Leirvåg v. Norway Communication no 
1155/2003 (2004) 19 BHRC 635), compulsory military conscription (see, for example, Muhonen v 
Finland Communication no 89/1981 (HRC 8 April 1985); Brinkhof v The Netherlands 
Communication no 402/1990 (1994) 1-2 IHRR 1992; Foin v. France Communication no 666/1995 
(1999) 7 IHRR 354), the registration of religious communities (see, for example, Malakhovsky v 
Belarus Communication no 1207/2003 (2006) 13 IHRR 60) and indoctrination (Kang v Republic 
of Korea Communication no 878/1999 (2003) 10 IHRR 932).  
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religious clothing, more specifically.64 In contrast, the ECtHR’s article 9 case law has 
developed considerably since its decision in Kokkinakis v Greece in 1993,65 and there 
is a significant body of jurisprudence concerning the right to manifest religion by 
wearing religious clothing.66  
 The ECtHR’s early jurisprudence on religious clothing has significantly 
influenced the evolution of its subsequent jurisprudence. Principles established in 
cases concerning Turkey have subsequently been applied in cases concerning France, 
including Jasvir Singh and Ranjit Singh considered here.67  Although the ECtHR is 
not bound by precedent and the French cases could have been distinguished from the 
Turkish cases on the basis of both the facts and the margin of appreciation, from the 
perspective of legal certainty, it would appear to be preferable for the ECtHR to 
																																								 																				
64  Prior to the recent cases, the HRC had considered this issue under article 26 ICCPR in Singh 
Bhinder v Canada Communication no 208/1986 (HRC 28 November 1989) and, under article 18, 
in Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan Communication no 931/2000 (2005) 19 BHRC 581. However, 
the State did not justify the restriction, as required by article 18(3) ICCPR.  
65  Kokkinakis v Greece, above n 20. See, the Strasbourg Consortium for a comprehensive list of 
jurisprudence <http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/portal.case.php?pageId=10> last accessed 22 
April 2016. 
66  Karaduman v Turkey (1993) 74 DR 93; Dahlab v Switzerland, above n 24; Şahın v Turkey, above 
n 24; Phull v France (11 January 2005) App no 35753/03 ECHR 2005-I; Köse and 93 others v 
Turkey (24 January 2006) App no 26625/02 ECHR 2006-II; Kurtulmuş v Turkey (24 January 2006) 
App no 65500/01 ECHR 2006-II; El Morsli v France App no 15585/06 (ECtHR 4 March 2008); 
Mann Singh v France, above n 4; Dogru v France, above n 31; Aktas v France, above n 31; Jasvir 
Singh v France, above n 4; Ranjit Singh v France, above n 4; SAS v France, above n 32; 
Ebrahimian v France (26 November 2015) App no 64846/11 ECHR 2015. 
67  Dogru v France, above n 31; Aktas v France, above n 31; Jasvir Singh v France, above n 4; Ranjit 
Singh v France, above n 4. 
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decide these cases consistently. The HRC, in contrast, did not have an established 
body of jurisprudence and, thus, was better able to evaluate Bikramjit Singh, Mann 
Singh and Ranjit Singh, considered here, on the basis of the evidence presented.  
The differing jurisdiction and normative status of the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR and HRC may also provide some explanation for the discrepancy between the 
analogous cases. The ECtHR has compulsory jurisdiction in respect of the 47 Member 
States of the Council of Europe, States which have a predominantly Christian or 
secular tradition.68 In contrast, although the HRC only has jurisdiction to receive 
individual communications in respect of those States that have ratified Optional 
Protocol 1,69 it hears cases concerning a more diverse range of States than the ECtHR. 
Nonetheless, with the exception of Monaco, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, all 
Member States of the Council of Europe have permitted individual communications 
to the HRC.70  
The ECtHR issues legally binding judgments, in contrast to the non-binding 
‘views’ of the HRC. Drzemczewski has argued that the ECHR is sui generis because 
the ‘law transcends the traditional boundaries drawn between international law and 
domestic law’. 71  Consequently, the ECtHR has permitted States a margin of 
																																								 																				
68  Albania, Turkey and Azerbaijan are notable exceptions.  
69  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171, 
entered into force 23 March 1976.  
70  United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter V Human Rights, Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en> 
last accessed 22 April 2016.	
71  A Drzemczewski ‘The Sui Generis Nature of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1980) 
29 ICLQ 54 at p 54. 
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appreciation in cases where a clear consensus has not emerged in Europe,72 to ensure 
that it does not overstep the boundaries of State sovereignty. Nonetheless, as 
recognised by the European Commission on Human Rights, excessive deference to 
State sovereignty has the potential to undermine the purpose of the ECHR.73 The 
ECtHR should, therefore, ensure that the margin of appreciation does not prevent it 
from acting as the ‘conscience’ of Europe.74  
In contrast, as the decisions of the HRC are not legally binding and it does not 
recognise the principle of the margin of appreciation, it is arguably less concerned 
with State sovereignty. This perhaps gives the HRC more scope than the ECtHR to 
reach decisions that are unpopular with States. However, in practice, this has also 
meant that States do not always comply with the decisions of the HRC.75 
 On the basis of these differences, some variance must be expected between the 
approaches of the regional ECtHR and the international HRC. Nonetheless, this 
should not lead to uncertainty over the scope of protected rights nor call into question 
the universality of rights.76 It is, therefore, necessary to analyse the reasoning that has 
																																								 																				
72  Şahın v Turkey, above n 24, para 109. See also, Dogru v France, above n 31, para 72. 
73  X v United Kingdom Application No 4451/70, Report of the Commission of 1 June 1973, Series B 
no 16, p 12 et seq, 31.  
74  Statement of Lynn Ungoed-Thomas (United Kingdom) at Consultative Assembly 1st Session in 
Council of Europe, Collected Edition of the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the European Convention 
on Human Rights Volume 2: Consultative Assembly, Second Session of the Committee of Ministers, 
Standing Committee of the Assembly 10 August-18 November 1949 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1975) p 174. 
75  HRC, ‘Observations finales concernant le cinquième rapport périodique du France’ UN doc. 
CCPR/C/FRA/CO/5 para 7.  
76  This also raises the issue of applicants undertaking forum shopping, which falls outside the scope 
of this article.  
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resulted in this discrepancy and consider the extent to which the two bodies’ decisions 
are compatible with the identified good faith interpretation of the right to manifest 
religion.  
 
(b) Mann Singh (ECtHR) and Mann Singh & Ranjit Singh (HRC) 
 
In Mann Singh77 heard by the ECtHR and Ranjit Singh78 and Mann Singh79 heard by 
the HRC, the right of a Sikh man to manifest his religion by wearing a turban on a 
photograph affixed to an identification document was considered. Both bodies 
acknowledged that the requirement that the applicants appear without their turban in 
these photographs interfered with their right to manifest religion. Before the HRC, 
France sought to justify the interference on the grounds of ‘public order’ and ‘public 
safety’ under article 18(3) ICCPR.80 Despite recognising that the aim of the restriction 
was legitimate,81 the HRC considered the proportionality of the restriction:  
 
[T]he State party has not explained why the wearing of a Sikh turban 
covering the top of the head and a portion of the forehead but leaving the 
rest of the face clearly visible would make it more difficult to identify the 
author than if he were to appear bareheaded, since he wears his turban at 
all times. Nor has the State party explained how, specifically, identity 
																																								 																				
77  Mann Singh v France, above n 4. 
78  Ranjit Singh v France, above n 5. 
79  Mann Singh v France, above n 5. 
80  Ranjit Singh v France, above n 5, para 5.3. 
81  Ibid. para 8.4. 
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photographs in which people appear bareheaded help to avert the risk of 
fraud or falsification of residence permits.82  
 
The HRC also considered the potential for the initial interference to result in 
continuing violations of the applicants’ rights ‘because he would always appear 
without his religious head covering in the identity photograph and could therefore be 
compelled to remove his turban during identity checks’. 83  By scrutinising the 
justifications given by the State for the restriction of the right to manifest religion, the 
HRC was able to assess the proportionality of the interference and, in particular, 
identify the potential for repeat violations to flow from the original restriction. On the 
basis of the lack of evidence of the necessity of the restriction, the HRC found a 
violation of article 18 ICCPR. Thus, the HRC prioritised the applicants’ right to 
manifest their religion above the justifications given by the State. This approach 
conforms with the requirement that the State evidence the necessity of limitations and, 
thus, is compatible with a good faith interpretation of the right.  
 In contrast, in Mann Singh v France, the ECtHR found that the application 
was manifestly ill-founded and, therefore, inadmissible, on the basis that the State has 
a wide margin of appreciation in matters concerning ‘public safety’ and ‘public order’. 
In direct contrast to the HRC, the ECtHR accepted that the removal of the turban was 
necessary to allow the identification of the driver and avoid fraud,84 despite the lack 
of evidence to support this conclusion. By not engaging with the necessity and 
proportionality of the restriction on the applicant’s rights, the ECtHR, in effect, 
																																								 																				
82  Ibid. 
83  Ibid. 
84  Mann Singh v France, above n 5. 
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reversed the burden of proof under the limitations clause and placed the onus on the 
applicant to prove that the State had acted unreasonably. When the approach of the 
ECtHR is compared to that of the HRC, it becomes apparent that the margin of 
appreciation inhibited the ECtHR from examining evidence of the necessity of the 
restriction on the applicant’s rights, as required by article 9(2) ECHR. This is 
incompatible with a good faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion, which 
establishes that the grounds of limitations are to be construed narrowly and that the 
burden of proof lies with the State.  
Had the ECtHR applied a good faith interpretation of the right, Mann Singh 
may have been decided differently. In the absence of evidence of the necessity of the 
restriction of religious freedom, the ECtHR should have prioritised the applicant’s 
right and found a violation. Nonetheless, this outcome cannot be taken for granted. 
Had the case been found to be admissible, the adversarial process in the ECtHR may 
have given France the opportunity to provide additional evidence of the necessity of 
the interference with the applicant’s right to manifest religion. In the event that this 
demonstrated that the removal of the turban made it easier to identify the applicant 
and helped to combat fraud, then the application of the margin of appreciation and a 
finding of no violation would be legitimate on the grounds of ‘public safety’ and 
‘public order’. However, a more rigorous decision-making process would have 
provided a more satisfactory outcome for the applicant85 and been faithful to the idea 
																																								 																				
85  This raises questions about the role of the ECtHR and whether it should act as a constitutional 
court or provide individual justice. This falls outside the scope of this paper. See further, K 
Dzehtsiarou and A Greene ‘Restructuring the European Court of Human Rights: Preserving the 
Right of Individual Petition and Promoting Constitutionalism’ (2013) Public Law 710.  
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that limitations be narrowly construed and subject to the requirements of necessity 
and proportionality.  
 
(c) Jasvir Singh & Ranjit Singh (ECtHR) and Bikramjit Singh (HRC) 
 
A similar comparison can be drawn between the cases of Bikramjit Singh86 heard by 
the HRC and Jasvir Singh87 and Ranjit Singh,88 heard by the ECtHR, involving the 
expulsion of the Sikh applicants from State schools in France for refusing to remove 
the keski. The expulsion of the applicants from school was pursuant to Loi no 2004-
228, which prohibits the wearing of ostentatious religious symbols in State schools in 
order to uphold the principle of laïcité.89 
 In Bikramjit Singh, the HRC considered that the prohibition on wearing 
religious symbols in State schools in order to uphold ‘the constitutional principle of 
secularism (laïcité)’ 90 pursued the grounds of ‘the rights and freedoms of others’, 
‘public order and safety’.91 The HRC was willing to acknowledge the value of 
secularism: ‘the principle of secularism (laïcité), is itself a means by which a State 
																																								 																				
86  Bikramjit Singh v France, above n 5.  
87  Jasvir Singh v France, above n 4. 
88  Ranjit Singh v France, above n 4. 
89  Loi no 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de 
signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées 
publics. The concept of laïcité is found in article 1 of the French Constitution and refers to the 
separation of Church and State. It is similar to secularism. 
90  Bikramjit Singh v France, above n 5, para 8.2. 
91  Ibid, para 8.6. 
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party may seek to protect the religious freedom of all its population’.92 However, it 
was ‘of the view that the State party has not furnished compelling evidence that by 
wearing his keski the author would have posed a threat to the rights and freedoms of 
other pupils or to order at the school’.93 In particular, the penalty of expulsion from 
school was considered to be disproportionate and not based on the conduct of the 
applicant himself.94 The HRC was, thus, not willing to accept that the restriction of 
the applicant’s right to manifest religion was justified by the pursuit of secularism 
alone. The HRC found a violation of article 18 ICCPR as there was insufficient 
evidence of the necessity of the restriction and the penalty for wearing the keski was 
disproportionate. 
In the cases of Jasvir Singh v France and Ranjit Singh v France, the ECtHR 
built on its earlier jurisprudence concerning the restriction of the right to manifest 
religion on the basis of ‘the constitutional principle of secularism’95 and found the 
claims to be manifestly ill-founded.96 The ECtHR found that the expulsion of the 
applicants from State Schools was not disproportionate to the aim pursued: ‘the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ and ‘public order’ through the pursuit 
of secularist policies in State schools. Notably, the ECtHR did not consider whether 
the individual applicants posed a threat to ‘the rights and freedoms of others’, as the 
measures taken in pursuit of laïcité fell within the State’s margin of appreciation.97  
																																								 																				
92  Ibid. 
93  Ibid, para 8.7. 
94  Ibid. 
95  Dahlab v Switzerland, above n 24; Köse and 93 others v Turkey, above n 66; Dogru v France, 
above n 31. 
96  Jasvir Singh v France, above n 4; Ranjit Singh v France, above n 4. 
97  Ibid. 
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 The distinction between the ECtHR and HRC’s decisions can be attributed to 
the extent to which they were willing to engage with the necessity of restrictions 
justified by the pursuit of secularism. The HRC has questioned the necessity of 
restrictions in schools on the basis ‘that respect for a public culture of laïcité would 
not seem to require forbidding wearing such common religious symbols’.98 In contrast, 
the ECtHR has permitted France a wide margin of appreciation in the absence of an 
established consensus on this issue in Europe.99 This has led the ECtHR to uncritically 
accept the legitimacy of restrictions of religious freedom justified by the pursuit of 
secularist policies. 
 Although secularism is not expressly mentioned as a ground for the limitation 
of the right to manifest religion, to the extent that this principle seeks to protect ‘the 
rights and freedoms of others’ and ‘public order’, it is possible to justify the extension 
of the limitations clause within a good faith interpretation. However, this is not by 
itself sufficient to establish that the restriction of the applicant’s rights is necessary in 
a democratic society. In order to prevent unnecessary State interference with religious 
freedom, the limitations clause must be construed narrowly and restrictions must be 
proportionate.  
   
(i) The Prioritisation of Secularism above Religious Freedom 
 
A good faith interpretation of religious freedom requires that priority is afforded to 
the right itself and that the necessity of limitations is evidenced. In the context of 
																																								 																				
98  HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee - France UN doc 
CCPR/C/FRA/CO/4, 31 July 2008, para 23. 
99  Şahın v Turkey, above n 24, para 109. See also, Dogru v France, above n 31, para 72. 
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secularism, Bielefeldt, the UN Special Rapporteur on the freedom of religion or belief, 
has stressed that freedom of religion is a ‘first order’ principle, whereas ‘neutrality’ is 
a ‘second order’ principle, ‘[t]urning the order of things upside down and pursuing a 
policy of enforced privatization or societal marginalization of religions in the name of 
“neutrality” would thus clearly amount to a violation of human rights’.100 This 
understanding has been confirmed in the ECtHR by Judge Bonello, who stressed that 
‘secularism, pluralism, the separation of Church and State, religious neutrality, 
religious tolerance … are not values protected by the Convention, and it is 
fundamentally flawed to juggle these dissimilar concepts as if they were 
interchangeable with freedom of religion’.101 
 However, in Jasvir Singh and Ranjit Singh, the ECtHR did exactly this. In 
cases concerning religious clothing the ECtHR has stressed that ‘an attitude which 
fails to respect that principle [secularism] will not necessarily be accepted as being 
covered by the freedom to manifest one’s religion and will not enjoy the protection of 
Article 9 of the Convention’.102 Contrary to a good faith interpretation, the ECtHR has 
prioritised the pursuit of secularism above individual religious freedom. As States are 
permitted a wide margin of appreciation, the ECtHR does not consider the necessity 
of restrictions on the applicants’ rights. This approach is particularly problematic, as 
the ECtHR has not scrutinised the extent to which secularism, in practice, pursues one 
of the permissible grounds of restriction.  
 
																																								 																				
100  H Bielefeldt ‘Freedom of Religion of Belief—A Human Right under Pressure’ (2012) 1 Oxford 
Journal of Law and Religion 15 at p 32.  
101 Lautsi and Others v Italy (2012) 54 EHRR 3 Judge Bonello’s concurring opinion para 2.2 
[emphasis added]. 
102  Dogru v France, above n 31, para 72. See also, Şahın v Turkey, above n 24, paras 113-114. 
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 (ii) Secularism as the Protector of Individual Religious Freedom? 
 
The margin of appreciation afforded to France, in Jasvir Singh and Ranjit Singh, is 
based on the presumption that the pursuit of State secularism, through the separation 
of Church and State, is compatible with Convention rights.103 The ECtHR has 
accepted that State secularism complies with the role of the State ‘neutral and 
impartial organiser’.104 Furthermore, McGoldrick has suggested that ‘both the ECtHR 
and HRC have accepted [secularism], seeks to protect the religious freedom of all its 
population’. 105 As noted by the ECtHR in Kokkinakis, limitations on the right to 
manifest religion may be necessary in order to reconcile the competing rights of 
different groups.106 Thus, to the extent that secularism seeks to protect ‘the rights and 
freedoms of others’ by protecting individual religious freedom, restrictions on 
religious freedom can be justified.  
 However, while the HRC has scrutinised whether secularism does in fact 
pursue ‘the rights and freedoms of others’, the ECtHR has uncritically accepted this as 
given. Yet, secularism is an ‘abstract principle’ 107  and is open to competing 
interpretations.108 Notably, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the freedom of 
religion or belief, Asma Jahangir, expressed concern:  
 
																																								 																				
103  Şahın v Turkey, above n 24, para 114. 
104  Ibid, para 107. Dogru v France, above n 31, para 106. 
105  D McGoldrick ‘A Defence of the Margin of Appreciation and an Argument for its Application by 
the Human Rights Committee’ (2016) 65 ICLQ 21 at p 52. [References omitted]. 
106  Kokkinakis v Greece  above n 20, para 31. 
107  Ebrahimian v France, above n 66, Dissenting opinion of Judge De Gaetano.  
108  R Adhar ‘Is Secularism Neutral?’ (2013) 25 Ratio Juris 404.  
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[w]hile recognizing that the organization of a society according to this 
principle [secularism] may not only be healthy, but also guarantees the 
fundamental right to freedom of religion or belief, she is concerned that, 
in some circumstances, the selective interpretation and rigid application of 
the principle has operated at the expense of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief.109 
 
Thus, the compatibility of secularism with the pursuit of the ‘rights and freedoms of 
others’ should not be taken for granted. ‘Benevolent secularism’, according to Adhar, 
‘is a philosophy obliging the state to refrain from adopting and imposing any 
established beliefs ... upon its citizens’. 110  Although not strictly neutral, 111  as 
benevolent secularism seeks to uphold the freedom of religion or belief of individuals 
by promoting non-interference by the State in matters of conscience, this would 
appear to be compatible with a good faith interpretation of freedom of religion or 
belief.  
 In contrast, ‘“hostile” secularism says the state should actively pursue a policy 
of established unbelief’.112 The goal of hostile secularism is the separation of Church 
																																								 																				
109  ECOSOC ‘Civil and Political Rights, including the Question of Religious Intolerance: Report 
submitted by Asma Jahangir, Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief Addendum 2 – 
Mission to France (18 to 29 September 2005)’ (8 March 2006) UN doc E/CN.4/2006/5/Add.4, 
para 96.  
110  Adhar, above n 108, p 409. 
111  Ibid, p 420. 
112  Ibid, p 411. 
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and State,113 through the elimination of religion from the public sphere, rather than the 
protection of religious freedom. The restriction of individual religious freedom on the 
basis of hostile secularism is incompatible with a good faith interpretation of the right 
for a number of reasons. First, by prioritising the separation of Church and State 
above individual religious freedom, hostile secularism does not seek to protect ‘the 
rights and freedoms of others’. Second, the elimination of religious manifestations 
from the public sphere is incompatible with the text of the right, which explicitly 
establishes ‘the right to manifest religion in public and in private’. Third, the pursuit 
of the separation of Church and State as an inherent good is analogous to the pursuit 
of a political ideology.114 Under a good faith interpretation of freedom of religion or 
belief, State interference with individual religious freedom must not be motivated by 
the preservation of State ideologies. Fourth, hostile secularism disadvantages minority 
religious practices which do not conform as easily as Christian and secular 
manifestations to the privatisation of religion.115 Thus, in Western Europe, the pursuit 
of hostile secularism disproportionately impacts religious minorities, contrary to the 
concerns and intentions of the drafters of human rights instruments. This suggests that 
the State is not neutral in exercising its powers, contrary to a good faith interpretation.  
																																								 																				
113  R Sandberg and N Doe ‘Church-State Relations in Europe’ (2007) 1 Religion Compass 561 at p 
565 
114  J Temperman State-Religion Relationships and Human Rights Law: Towards a Right to 
Religiously Neutral Governance (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) p 140.  
115  Evans, above n 7, p 305; M Evans, and P Petkoff ‘A Separation of Convenience? The Concept of 
Neutrality in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 36 Religion, State 
& Society 205; PG Danchin ‘Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2010-2011) 32 Michigan Journal of International Law 663 at p 689. 
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 Adhar has also warned that ‘[a] benevolent secularism can, overtime, 
unerringly slide into a hostile secularism’. 116 Thus, restrictions on the right to 
manifest religion in order to uphold secularism should not be uncritically accepted, 
without oversight by human rights bodies. Yet, by permitting France a wide margin of 
appreciation in Jasvir Singh and Ranjit Singh, the ECtHR unquestioningly accepted 
that State secularism seeks to protect ‘the rights and freedoms of others’. This is 
problematic from the perspective of a good faith interpretation as by interfering with 
religious freedom and seeking to eliminate religion from the public sphere, the 
prohibition on the wearing of ‘ostentatious religious symbols’ in schools pursues a 
vision of hostile secularism.  
 Although in Bikramjit Singh the HRC accepted that ‘secularism (laïcité), is 
itself a means by which a State party may seek to protect the religious freedom of all 
its population’,117 it did not automatically accept that all measures adopted in the 
name of laïcité seek to uphold religious freedom. For the HRC, secularism is a tool by 
which to achieve religious freedom rather than an end in itself. Thus, while the HRC 
may be willing to accept restrictions on article 18 ICCPR, justified by benevolent 
secularism, measures that pursue hostile secularism clearly contravene this right.  
 




116  Adhar, above n 108, p 415. See also I Leigh and R Adhar ‘Post-Secularism and the European 
Court of Human Rights: Or How God Never Really Went Away’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 
1064 at p 1083. 
117  Ibid, para 8.6. 
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If the State is able to demonstrate that the pursuit of secularism seeks to protect ‘the 
rights and freedoms of others’ or ‘public order’, in accordance with a good faith 
interpretation, it must still evidence the necessity of any restrictions imposed on this 
basis. The difference between the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and HRC can also be 
attributed to the extent to which the bodies were willing to accept that the presence of 
religion in the public sphere constituted a threat to ‘the rights and freedoms of others’ 
or ‘public order’.  
The approach of the ECtHR to date has been motivated by the concern that 
those wearing religious symbols in the public sphere may be ‘seeking to provoke a 
reaction, proselytizing, spreading propaganda or undermining the rights of others’.118 
However, by attributing a meaning to religious symbols, the ECtHR prejudges the 
‘threat’ posed by the individual to ‘the rights and freedoms of others’ and ‘public 
order’. The ECtHR has accepted that the crucifix ‘is an essentially passive symbol’,119 
whereas, the hijab is a ‘powerful external symbol’.120 In practice, this distinction has 
led to different results in cases concerning religious freedom. In Eweida and Others v 
United Kingdom121 the ECtHR accepted that the right to manifest religion by wearing 
a crucifix,  
 
is a fundamental right: because a healthy democratic society needs to 
tolerate and sustain pluralism and diversity; but also because of the value 
																																								 																				
118  Ebrahimian v France, above n 66, Partly Concurring and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
O’Leary. See also Şahın v Turkey, above n 24, para 112.  
119  Lautsi and Others v Italy, above n 101, para 72.  
120  Dahlab v Switzerland, above n 24. 
121  Eweida and Others v United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 8, para 94. 
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to an individual who has made religion a central tenet of his or her life to 
be able to communicate that belief to others.122  
 
In contrast, in Şahın, the ECtHR accepted that restrictions on the hijab legitimately 
pursue the ‘aim of ensuring peaceful coexistence between students of various faiths 
and thus protecting public order and the beliefs of others’.123 Accordingly, the 
communication of the applicant’s religion through the wearing of a crucifix is 
necessary to sustain pluralism and tolerance in society, whereas the limitation of the 
hijab is necessary to achieve similar ends.  
 The ECtHR has found this distinction to be legitimate even when applicants 
have chosen to wear less ostentatious religious symbols such as the keski rather than 
the turban124 and a bandana rather than a hijab.125 The approach of the ECtHR has, 
thus, led to the presumption that while manifestations of Christianity are to be 
tolerated, manifestations of Islam and Sikhism can be legitimately viewed as a threat.  
In contrast to the ECtHR, no attempt has been made by the HRC to attribute meanings 
to religious symbols in order to justify their differential treatment. Furthermore, the 
diverse composition of the HRC,126 coupled with the established principle that ‘the 
																																								 																				
122  Ibid. 
123  Şahın v Turkey, above n 24, para 111. 
124  Jasvir Singh v France, above n 4. 
125  Dogru v France, above n 31. 
126  Under article 31(2) ICCPR, ‘[i]n the election of the Committee, consideration shall be given to 
equitable geographical distribution of membership and to the representation of the different forms 
of civilization and of the principal legal systems’. 
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concept of morals should not be drawn exclusively from a single tradition’,127 reduces 
the likelihood that the HRC will prioritise one ideology above others in the future. 
In addition to imputing a meaning to religious symbols, the ECtHR has also 
been criticised by commentators,128 and dissenting judges in the ECtHR129 for not 
requiring evidence of the threat posed by individual applicants in cases concerning 
religious clothing. McGoldrick has argued that ‘[t]he threat comes not from the single 
individual but from the combined effect of all the religious individuals concerned’.130 
This understanding suggests that it is the presence of religious symbols in the public 
sphere, rather than the actions of individuals that poses a threat to ‘the rights and 
freedoms of others’ and ‘public order’. However, the threat posed by the presence of 
religious symbols is unsubstantiated. Indeed, Judge Power argued in Lautsi: 
 
The display of a religious symbol does not compel or coerce an individual 
to do or to refrain from doing anything. ... It does not prevent an 
individual from following his or her own conscience nor does it make it 
unfeasible for such a person to manifest his or her own religious beliefs 
and ideas.131 
																																								 																				
127  K Boyle ‘Freedom of Religion in International Law’ in J Rehman and SC Breau (eds) Religion, 
Human Rights and International Law: a Critical Examination of Islamic State Practices (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) p 43. 
128  See, for example, C Evans ‘The “Islamic Scarf” in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 7 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 52; Evans and Petkoff , above n 115, p 208. 
129  Şahın v Turkey, above n 24, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tulkens para 10; Ebrahimian v France, 
above n 66, Partly Concurring and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge O’Leary. 
130  McGoldrick, above n 105, p 52 
131  Lautsi and Others v Italy, above n 101, Concurring Opinion of Judge Power.  




As the right to manifest religion explicitly encompasses public manifestations, the 
mere presence of religion in the public sphere cannot per se constitute a threat to ‘the 
rights and freedoms of others’. Moreover, the possible discomfort of the majority at 
the increased visibility of minority religious symbols in Western Europe cannot 
justify their elimination, as there is no right not to be offended within the ECHR.132 It 
is submitted that the only threat posed by the presence of religious symbols in schools 
is to hostile secularism. However, as noted above, in its hostile form, secularism does 
not seek to protect ‘the rights and freedoms of others’ but rather seeks to eliminate 
religion from the public sphere. As this is not the purpose for which limitations were 
prescribed, and in the absence of a demonstrable threat to either ‘public order’ or ‘the 
rights and freedoms of others’, secularism does not justify the restriction of the right 
to manifest religion.  
 In Jasvir Singh and Ranjit Singh, the ECtHR did not require evidence of a 
threat posed by the individual applicants. This approach is incompatible with a good 
faith interpretation of the right as it undermined the intention that non-interference 
with religious freedom should be the default position, unless restrictions are proven to 
be necessary. In direct contrast, in Bikramjit Singh, the HRC was not willing to accept 
that secularism was sufficient to justify restrictions on the applicant’s right without 




132  Handyside v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737 para 49. 
133  Bikramjit Singh v France, above n 5, para 8.7. 
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(iv) The Implications of a Good Faith Interpretation of Freedom of Religion in cases 
concerning Secularism 
  
In practice, the HRC has prioritised the right to manifest religion above the pursuit of 
secularism in accordance with a good faith interpretation of the right. Measures that 
restrict religious freedom cannot be justified by secularism alone, but rather must 
respond to a threat posed by the individual manifestation of religion to ‘the rights and 
freedoms of others’ or ‘public order’. In contrast, as a result of the margin of 
appreciation, the ECtHR has adopted an uncritical approach when States have 
invoked secularism as the basis of the limitation of an individual’s religious freedom. 
This approach has been demonstrated to be incompatible with a good faith 
interpretation of religious freedom.  
 Had the ECtHR engaged with the necessity of restricting Jasvir Singh and 
Ranjit Singh’s rights it is likely to have found a violation. The educational sphere has 
been central to the pursuit of laïcité in France since 1905.134 However, prior to 2004 it 
was not considered necessary to impose blanket restrictions on the wearing of 
religious symbols by pupils, in order to uphold this principle.135 Therefore, the 
necessity of such measures must be questioned. The 2004 law signaled a shift towards 
a hostile form of secularism that seeks to eliminate religion from the public sphere 
rather than upholding individual religious freedom. In the absence of a demonstrable 
																																								 																				
134  1905 Loi de Séperation des Églises et de l'État.	
135  While the Conseil d'Etat had given schools discretion in this respect following the 1989 affaire du 
foulard, it had expressly noted that religious symbols were not per se incompatible with laïcité. 
Avis du Conseil D'État Du 27 Novembre 1989, Sur le Port du Voile á L'Ecole. 
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threat posed by the presence of religion in society, this is incompatible with a good 
faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion.  
This does not imply that States cannot invoke secularism as a justification for 
the restriction of religious freedom. Rather, the ECtHR should adopt a more nuanced 
approach and exercise a higher level of scrutiny when States invoke the secularism 
justification. The restriction of the manifestation of religion by State representatives, 
as in Dahlab v Switzerland136 and Ebrahimian v France,137 is a more complex issue 
which perhaps requires a degree of deference to the State’s margin of appreciation. 
Such restrictions are more clearly linked to the separation of Church and State, than 
the restrictions in Jasvir Singh and Ranjit Singh. It is possible to envisage how such 
measures seek to ensure the neutrality of the State and its representatives and, thus, 
guarantee the freedom of religion or belief of all members of society.  
Nonetheless, such measures still pursue a form of hostile secularism, which 
seeks to eliminate religion from the public sphere. Whilst those with a preference for 
a secular State may perceive that they are treated equally within such a system, those 
individuals who do not share this worldview may feel disadvantaged. As noted by 
Judge Power, ‘[n]eutrality requires a pluralist approach on the part of the State, not a 
secularist one. It encourages respect for all world views rather than a preference for 
one’.138 Thus, whilst a margin of appreciation can be justified in cases concerning 
State representatives, this does not warrant complete deference and must go ‘hand in 
																																								 																				
136  Dahlab v Switzerland, above n 24. 
137  Ebrahimian v France, above n 66.	
138  Lautsi and Others v Italy, above n 101, Concurring Opinion of Judge Power. 
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hand with a European supervision’.139 In particular, the ECtHR must monitor whether 
such measures disproportionately disadvantage minority religions.  
 
4. SOCIETAL CONSENSUS, EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY  
 
It has been argued that the ECtHR’s jurisprudence is inconsistent with a good faith 
interpretation of freedom of religion. This can be attributed to the award of a wide 
margin of appreciation, which has prevented the ECtHR from scrutinising evidence of 
the necessity of restrictions and the extent to which the measures in question pursue a 
permissible ground of limitation. This margin of appreciation has been justified on the 
basis of the lack of consensus in Europe regarding the role of religion in society.140  
Yet, at the time of the adoption of the ECHR, the drafters recognised the importance 
of the right to manifest religion. Indeed, the French representative at the drafting of 
the ECHR, Mr Teitgen, described freedom of religion or belief as an example ‘of the 
fundamental undisputed freedoms’.141 Instead, the lack of consensus can be attributed 
to societal developments and, in particular, in the Western European context, 
decreased religiosity amongst the population,142 alongside the discomfort of the 
majority with the visible presence of minority religions. 
Although the ECtHR has not engaged in a detailed re-interpretation of the 
scope of the right to manifest religion on the basis of the living nature of the ECHR, 
by permitting States a wide margin of appreciation, the ECtHR has effectively 
																																								 																				
139  Şahın v Turkey, above n 24, para 110. 
140  Şahın v Turkey, above n 24, para 109. See also, Dogru v France, above n 31, para 72. 
141  Teitgen, above n 41, p 46. 
142  R McCrea Religion and the Public Order of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010) pp 22-23. 
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widened the permissible limitations to the right. By referencing the lack of consensus 
concerning the role of religion in society, 143  the ECtHR suggests that societal 
developments can be used to reduce as well as extend the scope of rights. Evolutive 
interpretation goes to the heart of both the purpose of rights and the role of the Court. 
Although evolutive interpretation allows societal change to influence the 
interpretation of Convention rights, it should not be employed in a manner that 
undermines the intention of the parties. Letsas has submitted that evolutive 
interpretation allows ‘evolution towards the moral truth of ECHR rights, not … 
evolution towards some commonly accepted standard, regardless of its content’.144 
The purpose of human rights instruments is to protect individuals from the power of 
the State and the tyranny of the majority. If this purpose is to be given effect, human 
rights bodies must not unquestioningly ratify societal change and interpret rights on 
the basis of ‘present day conditions’. By prioritising the preferences of the majority 
above the purpose and content of the right, this approach would compromise the 
universality of human rights standards.145 Instead, evolutive interpretation should be 
faithful to the object and purpose of rights, whilst ensuring their continuing relevance 
for contemporary European societies.146  
The right to freedom of religion or belief was adopted by the ten 
predominantly Christian drafting States of the ECHR in 1950, at a time when Western 
European societies were less diverse. However, the importance of protecting religious 
minorities from the tyranny of the majority and interference justified by the dominant 
																																								 																				
143  Şahın v Turkey, above n 24, para 109. See also, Dogru v France, above n 31, para 72. 
144  Letsas, above n 12, p 79.  
145  E Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards’ (1998-1999) 31 New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics 843 at p 844. 
146  Letsas, above n 12, p 79. 
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State ideology was recognised. In practice, the ECtHR has afforded a higher level of 
protection to Christian and secular belief as they are perceived to be ‘passive’ or 
‘neutral’. In contrast, visible manifestations of minority religious beliefs such as Islam 
and Sikhism, which were not prevalent in Western Europe at the time of the drafting 
of the ECHR, are rarely protected. Consequently, the scope of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief has not evolved to protect diverse religious groups but rather, 
through the limitations clause, has been narrowed in order to exclude them.  
 In France, laïcité was originally intended to protect individual religious 
freedom. However, Chadwick suggests that few have been willing to ‘openly grant 
laïcitiés guarantee of religious freedom to Islam’. 147 The move from ‘benevolent’ to 
‘hostile’ secularism in France appears to be underpinned by the discomfort of the 
majority with the visible presence of difference in society.148 Accordingly, laïcité has 
increasingly been interpreted to justify the pursuit of social homogeneity through the 
elimination of religion from the public sphere. 149 However, the ECtHR has not 
engaged with this issue in its jurisprudence. Similar critiques could be made of the 
ECtHR’s decision in SAS v France, where it accepted that restrictions on the burqa 
were necessary to ensure ‘living together’,150 despite recognising the Islamophobic 
nature of the debate that preceded the adoption of the law.151 Given the concerns of 
the drafters that religious minorities are particularly susceptible to interference with 
																																								 																				
147  K Chadwick ‘Education in secular France: (re)defining laïcité’ (1997) 5 Modern and 
Contemporary France 47 at pp 55-56. 
148  M Hunter-Henin ‘Why the French Don’t Like the Burqa: Laïcité, National Identity and Religious 
Freedom’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 613 at p 615. 
149  Chadwick, above n 147, p 55. 
150  SAS v France, above n 32, para 153 
151  Ibid, para 149.  
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religious freedom, it would be appropriate for human rights bodies to exert an extra 
level of scrutiny, when there is any possibility that the preferences of the majority are 
being used to justify restrictions on the rights of minorities.  
The recognition that there is not a consensus in Europe regarding the role of 
religion in society, does not lead to the conclusion that the right to freedom of religion 
or belief is any less significant to religious individuals. If the ECtHR is to protect the 
‘moral truth’152 of the right to manifest religion, it must ensure that it is interpreted to 
encompass the increasingly diverse religious communities and practices found within 




Although the right to freedom of religion or belief in the ECHR and ICCPR has a 
common origin in the UDHR, the ECtHR and HRC have interpreted the permissible 
limitations to this right inconsistently. This is problematic from the perspective of the 
universality of human rights standards and legal certainty. This article has identified a 
good faith interpretation of the right to freedom of religion or belief and has used this 
to analyse the approaches of the ECtHR and HRC in analogous cases.  
 The identified good faith interpretation reveals that the right to freedom of 
religion or belief was intended to restrict State interference in matters of conscience, 
in particular if motivated by dominant political or religious ideologies. Religious 
minorities were recognised to be particularly vulnerable to such interference. 
Consequently, the drafters envisaged that the limitations clause would be construed 
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narrowly and that States would be required to evidence the necessity and 
proportionality of any restrictions with reference to the grounds provided.  
 While the HRC’s decisions are consistent with a good faith interpretation of 
the right to manifest religion, this article has evidenced that the approach of the 
ECtHR is incompatible with the aims of the drafters. The ECtHR has permitted States 
to restrict this right without requiring evidence of the necessity of the restriction and 
has allowed the purpose and role of secularism to go unquestioned. Thus, the ECtHR 
has legitimised restrictions which seek to protect a State ideology, the strict 
Separation of Church and State, ahead of the concrete right. In effect, this has led 
Christian and secular beliefs to receive a higher level of protection under article 9 
ECHR than minority religious beliefs. This is incompatible with the intentions of the 
drafters and the identified good faith interpretation of the right.  
The adoption of a good faith interpretation is unlikely to lead to absolute 
conformity between the decisions of the ECtHR and HRC, especially as in cases 
concerning the manifestation of religion by State representatives the award of a 
margin of appreciation to the State can be justified. Nonetheless, in theory, it should 
lead to higher degree of conformity in terms of reasoning and in the outcome of the 
specific cases considered in this article. By requiring that the ECtHR engage with the 
necessity of restrictions, rather than simply deferring to the margin of appreciation, it 
would also result in a more satisfactory process for individual applicants. However, in 
practice, it is highly unlikely that the ECtHR will change its pre-existing lines of 
jurisprudence.  
There is, nonetheless, the potential for the ECtHR to adopt an approach 
consistent with a good faith interpretation when cases are distinguishable on the facts 
from those previously decided. Recent controversies have concerned restrictions on 
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the hijab imposed by private employers on the basis of secularism in Belgium and 
France153 and the wearing of long skirts by Muslim pupils in State schools in 
France. 154  This would require that the ECtHR undertake a more nuanced 
consideration of both the evidence provided by the State and the compatibility of 
secularism with the object and purpose of the right to manifest religion. Were the 
ECtHR not to adopt a good faith interpretation in these instances and continue to 
allow States a wide margin of appreciation, this would suggest that visible symbols of 
minority religions cannot derive any protection under article 9 ECHR.  
 Although the use of the margin of appreciation may be justifiable in some 
instances, this should not allow State power to go unchecked, otherwise the ECtHR 
would not be fulfilling its role as the ‘conscience’ of Europe.155 If the ECtHR is to act 
consistently with this mandate, it must employ evolutive interpretation to ensure the 
continuing relevance of the right to manifest religion to European societies. Moreover, 
it must protect the rights of vulnerable and even unpopular individuals despite 
popularist and democratic demands that their rights be restricted. 
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